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Abstract
We consider two-player random extensive form games where the payoffs at the leaves
are independently drawn uniformly at random from a given feasible set C. We study
the asymptotic distribution of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for binary-
trees with increasing depth in various random (or deterministic) assignments of players
to nodes. We characterize the assignments under which the asymptotic distribution
concentrates around a point. Our analysis provides a natural way to derive from the
asymptotic distribution a novel solution concept for two-player bargaining problems
with a solid strategic justification.
1 Introduction
A subgame perfect equilibrium is one of the fundamental solution concepts in game the-
ory. Its characterization is very simple: A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium
if it constitutes a Nash equilibrium of every subgame of the original game. In extensive
form games with perfect information, subgame perfect equilibrium coincides with backward-
induction and can be easily determined.
In this work we study the distribution of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in
random two-player extensive form games. In these games there are two potential natural
degrees of randomness that may be considered. The first is random payoffs where the payoffs
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at the leaves of the tree are randomly drawn. The second is random assignment of players to
nodes, where one of the two decision makers at every node is drawn at random in accordance
with a certain distribution. We restrict attention to binary trees with two players and focus
on the case where the payoffs are i.i.d. uniform random draws over a given domain C. Our
analysis combines the two potential sources of randomness and relates properties of the
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome to a solution concept in the theory of bargaining.
The existing literature on random games focuses on normal form games and studies
properties such as the expected number of Nash equilibrium [7, 8], the distribution of pure
Nash equilibria [3, 13, 15, 12, 14, 16] or the maximal number of equilibria [6]. Here we
restrict our attention to random extensive form games. We consider binary random games
and study the asymptotic properties of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome when the
depth is increasing. The fundamental natural question that arises is under which condition
the limit exists and whether in some sense the subgame perfect distribution concentrates
around a certain point, i.e., whether the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is close to a
certain point with probability close to 1, for sufficiently deep trees. Such a concentration
point, if exists, may serve as a benchmark solution for a bargaining problem with C as its
feasible set. Indeed this point has quite solid strategic justification: For almost all1 strategic
interactions of a quite natural type with outcomes in C, the solution of the interaction will
be close to this concentration point, i.e., for large enough perfect information games over
binary trees (with a particular assignment of players to control the nodes) and with payoffs
in C. Hence we are interested in characterizing the cases where concentration occurs, and
these cases will induce interesting incites into bargaining theory.
Our main theorem introduces the random extensive form bargaining solution that natu-
rally arises from random extensive form games (see Section 4.1). We characterize our solution
concept by introducing a sequence of increasing random extensive form games for which con-
centration around a point holds. This point defines our solution concept and satisfies the
three core axioms of a standard solution concept in bargaining: Symmetry, efficiency and
1By “almost all” we mean in the context of the standard Lebesgue measure (when we refer to games as
points in Rk for the correct dimension k). Note that analyzing probability under i.i.d. uniform distribution
is equivalent to analyzing the Lebesgue measure.
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scale invariance.
1.1 Application to Bargaining
Starting with Nash [11] in 1950, the bargaining problem has been widely studied from dif-
ferent perspectives. Two complementary trusts of the bargaining theory are the axiomatic
approach and implementation theory. The axiomatic approach aims to understand what
should be the solution of a bargaining problem by introducing basic properties that it should
satisfy. However, this approach provides no strategic reasoning for how this solution arises.
The so-called “Nash program” aims to support solutions in a non-cooperative framework.
This is exactly where implementation theory comes to play, where the goal is to design a
game (i.e., a bargaining mechanism) whose equilibrium is the solution.
Many axioms have been suggested in the context of bargaining. Among the suggested
axioms, the standard axioms that are satisfied by most of the classical solutions (e.g., Nash
solution [11], Kalai-Smorodinski solution [5], and others) are Pareto efficiency, Symmetry,
and Invariance with respect to positive affine transformations. The terminology of Kalai-
Smorodinsky [5] (see also [17]), defines a solution to be standard if it satisfies these three
axioms. Our focus will be on implementing a standard solution.
Implementation theory in bargaining, and in particular implementation in subgame per-
fect equilibrium, has been widely studied. Several mechanisms [10, 2, 4, 1, 9] have been
suggested for implementing standard bargaining solutions. All these mechanisms are based
on the idea that players sequentially offer an allocation that should be approved by the other
players.
We take a different approach to the implementation problem, and we pose the question:
Can a random extensive form game serve as an implementation to a standard bargaining
solution? Theorem 3 constitutes a positive answer to this question. This approach differs
from the above [10, 2, 4, 1, 9] in the following aspects.
First, the designed game is not based on offers and approvals. Second, it has minimalistic
requirements about the abilities of the designer: It is sufficient that the designer will be able
to draw outcomes from the bargaining set uniformly at random (as outcomes of the game)
in order to design a game whose equilibrium outcome is (close to) a standard solution.
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Third, our result, in some sense, answers the following type of questions: How hard is it
to implement a standard solution? How structured should the designed game be? Our
result can be interpreted as follows, almost all binary choice large enough extensive form
games (with a particular random structure of the decision maker over the nodes) implement
a standard bargaining solution.
1.2 Outline of the Results
For ease of clarity of the presentation, throughout the paper we focus on a specific simple
setting. As shown in Comment 1 of Section 5, our analysis holds in much more general
settings.
We let C ⊂ R2 be a compact convex set2. Let µ0 be the uniform distribution over3 C.
The game is played over a complete binary tree of depth n. The 2n payoffs at the leaves are
random independent draws in accordance with µ0.
We consider two benchmark models of assigning players to control nodes in the tree:
1. The alternating game. Player 1 controls all nodes at depths n− 1, n− 3, n− 5, ... Player
2 controls all nodes at depths n− 2, n− 4, n− 6, .... Such a game (with random payoffs)
will be denoted by An.
2. The random controlling player game. Each Player i = 1,2 controls each node with
probability 12 , where the controlling player at each node is drawn independently across
the nodes and independently of the payoffs. Such a game (with random controlling
players and random payoffs) will be denoted by Rn.
In Section 4 we consider additional assignments of players to nodes, which combines these
two models.
For both players i = 1,2, both random games An and Rn have no two equal payoffs
for player i with probability one. Therefore, both An and Rn have almost surely unique
subgame perfect equilibrium. We denote by Val(An) and Val(Rn) the random variable of
2Convexity of the set C is not essential; see Comment 1 of Section 5.
3Our analysis holds for every non-atomic probability distribution µ0 with positive density over C; see
Comment 1 of Section 5.
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the games’ value, which is the payoff profile at the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. We
are interested in the asymptotic properties of the values Val(An) and Val(Rn) when n→∞.
In particular are interested in the phenomena of concentration of the value which holds if
there exists a point c ∈ C such that the probability that Val(Tn) lies in a given neighborhood
of c goes to one as the depth of the tree goes to infinity. Formally,
Definition 1. For a sequence of random games (Tn)∞n=1, we say that Val(Tn) concentrates
around the point c ∈ R2 if the sequence Val(Tn) weakly converges to the Dirac measure on
the singleton c, i.e., Val(Tn)⇒ δc.
We start our analysis with the zero-sum case, namely C = {(x,−x)∣0 ≤ x ≤ 1}. The results
for random zero-sum games are as follows:
• For the alternating game, Val(An) concentrates around the point (b,−b), where b = √5−12
(Theorem 1).
• For the random controlling player model, however, we do not have a concentration
result. In fact, we have Val(Rn) = µ0, i.e., the value is distributed according to the
distribution of the initial payoffs for all n (Proposition 1).
Then we turn to the non-zero sum case where C is a convex set with non-empty interior.
The results for this case are as follows:
• For the alternating game, Val(An) concentrates around a Pareto efficient point (The-
orem 2).
• For the random controlling player game, although we do not have a concentration
around a point, we do have a concentration of Val(Rn) around the Pareto efficient
boundary (Proposition 2).
Our next target is to examine whether random extensive form games can serve as an
implementation to a bargaining solution. The set C can be considered as the feasible set of
alternatives. A solution concept assigns a unique point for every such feasible set. Therefore,
the first property that should be satisfied for such a random game is
1. Concentration of the value around a point.
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Another two natural properties that are common to most solution concepts in bargaining
(the standard axioms) are:
2. Pareto efficiency: The unique solution should be Pareto efficient.
3. Symmetry: For every symmetric sets C the solution should be symmetric.
By considering the results mentioned so far, we see that none of the suggested random
extensive form games enjoys all three properties. The alternating game concentrates around
a Pareto efficient point (Theorem 2). However, the concentration point does not satisfy
symmetry (Theorem 1); Player 1 who acts last has an advantage. The random controlling
player game is symmetric by nature; however it fails to satisfy concentration (Proposition
1).
It turns out that a random extensive form game, which satisfies all the above desirable
properties can be obtained by a “hybrid” of the two discussed cases (the alternating and the
random). In the hybrid game all nodes at depth n − k for odd k are controlled by Player
1 with probability 12 + ε and by Player 2 with the remaining probability 12 − ε. All nodes
at depth n − k for even k are controlled by Player 2 with probability 12 + ε and by Player 1
with probability 12 − ε. Such a game (with random controlling players and random payoffs)
will be denoted by Hεn. Note that H
1/2
n = An and H0n = Rn. We show in Theorem 3 that for
small values of ε the hybrid game Hεn, indeed (approximately) satisfies the above-mentioned
desirable property:
1. For every fixed ε > 0, the value of Hεn concentrates around a point.
2. For every fixed ε > 0, the concentration point of Val(Hεn) is Pareto efficient.
3. For a symmetric set C, given δ > 0 we can set ε > 0 such that the concentration point
of Val(Hεn) will be δ-close to the diagonal (i.e., δ-close to the symmetric solution).
2 Zero sum games
We first consider the case of random zero-sum games, where C = conv{(0,0), (1,−1)}, i.e.,
Player 1’s payoff is uniformly distributed in [0,1]. For convenience of notations, along this
6
section we drop the payoff of player 2, which is equal to minus player’s 1 payoff.
2.1 Alternating game
The following theorem states that the value of the alternating zero-sum game converges to
the golden ratio minus one.
Theorem 1. Val(An) concentrates around point b where b = √5−12 ≈ 0.62.
Proof. We denote µn ∶= Val(An). By the backward induction procedure we can deduce a
recursive formula for the sequence of measures (µn)∞n=1. The value of a game of depth n + 1
is a function of the values of the two subgames of depth n (which correspond to the two
possible actions of the player that controls the root). Note that the two values of the two
subgames are two independent draws according to µn. We denote by min(ν, ν) and max(ν, ν)
the minimum and the maximum of two independent draws according to ν, and we have the
following recursive formula
µn+1 = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max(µn, µn) if n is even
min(µn, µn) if n is odd
because Player 1 will choose the maximal value (among the two), and Player 2 will choose
the minimal.
For x ∈ [0,1] we denote Fn(x) = µn([0, x]). For n = 2k we have
F2k+1(x) = (F2k(x))2 (1)
because the maximum of two independent random variables is below x iff both of them are
below x. Note also that
F2k+2(x) = 2F2k+1(x) − (F2k+1(x))2 = 2 (F2k(x))2 − (F2k(x))4 . (2)
The first equality follows from the inclusion-exclusion principle. The second inequality fol-
lows from equation (1). Let ϕ(x) = 2x2−x4, and let ϕk be k times composition of ϕ on itself,
i.e.,
ϕk(x) = ϕ ○ ⋯ ○ ϕ´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
k times
(x).
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It readily follows by induction from equation (2) that
F2k(x) = ϕk(F0(x)) = ϕk(x). (3)
Note that for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, ϕ(x) is a monotonically increasing polynomial with three fixed
points: 0, b,1. In addition, ϕ(x) < x for 0 < x < b, and ϕ(x) > x for b < x < 1 (see Figure 3).
Figure 1: The function ϕ(x) = 2x2 − x4.
x
ϕ
1b
1
For every x < b we consider the sequence (F2k(x))∞k=0 = (ϕk(x))∞k=0, which is monotonically
decreasing because
ϕk+1(x) = ϕk(ϕ(x)) ≤ ϕk(x).
Let limk→∞ϕk(x) = l(x). The sequence is monotonically decreasing; therefore, l(x) is well
defined and l(x) ≤ x < b. Note also that l(x) is a fixed point of ϕ because
l(x) = lim
k→∞ϕk(x) = limk→∞ϕ(ϕk(x)) = ϕ(l(x)).
Hence l(x) = 0.
Using similar arguments we can show that for x > b the sequence limk→∞ϕk(x) is mono-
tonically increasing and its limit is the fixed point 1. Summarizing, we have
lim
k→∞F2k(x) = limk→∞ϕk(F0(x)) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if 0 < x < b
b if x = b.
1 if b < x ≤ 1.
(4)
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This implies that F2k converges to a limit Dirac measure concentrated in b. The fact that
the sequence {F2k+1}k converges to the same limit readily follows from equation (1).
We have proved that the CDF of µn pointwise converges to the CDF of the Dirac measure,
which implies weak convergence.
2.2 Random controlling player game
The following observation demonstrates that unlike alternating random games the value of
a random zero-sum game with random structure does not concentrate.
Proposition 1. For every n, Val(Rn) is the uniform distribution over [0,1].
Proof. Using similar arguments to those in the proof of Theorem 1, we can write a recursive
formula for the sequence of probability measures (νn)∞n=1 = (Val(Rn))∞n=1. We argue that
νk+1 = 1
2
max(νk, νk) + 1
2
min(νk, νk). (5)
This follows from the fact that with probability 12 Player 1 controls a certain vertex at depth
n− k − 1, and then he chooses the maximal payoff. With probability 12 Player 2 controls this
vertex, and then he chooses the minimal payoff. From this recursive formula we deduce that
νk+1([0, x]) = 1
2
(νk([0, x]))2 + 1
2
[2νk([0, x]) − (νk([0, x]))2] = νk([0, x]).
Namely, the sequence of measures (νn)∞n=1 remains constant for every initial probability
measure ν0.
3 General Domains
Now we consider the case where C ⊂ R2 is a general compact convex set with non-empty
interior.
Definition 2. For a point x ∈ R2 we denote C>>(x) ∶= {c ∈ C ∶ c1 > x1 and c2 > x2} the first
quadrant with the origin at point x. Similarly we denote C<>(x), C<<(x), and C><(x) the
second, third, and fourth quadrants respectively, see Figure 2. More generally we denote
C◻∎(x) ∶= {c ∈ C ∶ c1 ◻ x1 and c2 ∎ x2} where ◻,∎ ∈ {≤,<,≥,>}.
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Figure 2: The sets C>>(x), C<>(x), C<<(x), and C><(x).
3.1 Alternating game
As in the zero-sum case, the value of the alternating game concentrates around a point.
Moreover the concentration point is Pareto efficient.
Theorem 2. The value of the alternating game Val(An) concentrates around a Pareto
efficient point.
Proof. For x ∈ R we denote C1(x) = {(x′, y′) ∈ C ∶ x′ ≤ x}, similarly, for y ∈ R we denote
C2(y) = {(x′, y′) ∈ C ∶ y′ ≤ y}. We let F 1n(x) ∶= νn(C1(x)) be the CDF of the marginal of νn
to Player 1’s payoffs and F 2n(y) = νn(C2(y)) to Player 2’s payoffs. Let xn be the number x
for which F 1n(x) = b and similarly yn is defined by the number y for which F 2n(y) = b.
Lemma 1. Both (x2n)∞n=1 and (y2n+1)∞n=1 are increasing sequences.
Proof. In order to show that x2n is increasing with n it is sufficient to show that
µ2n+2(C1(x2n)) ≤ b. (6)
Since if (6) holds, then F2n+2(x2n) ≤ b, and by the monotonicity of the CDF we have that
x2n+2 ≥ x2n.
First, note that µ2n(C1(x2n)) = b and hence µ2n+1(C1(x2n)) = b2; this follows directly by
a similar consideration as in equation (1).
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Now we consider step 2n + 2. Clearly, µ2n+2(C1(x2n)) is bounded from above by the
probability that two i.i.d. draws that are distributed according to µ2n+1 lies in C1(x2n)
(because µ2n+2 is essentially obtained by a selection rule among i.i.d. outcomes that are
distributed according to µ2n+1). Therefore we have
µ2n+2(C1(x2n)) ≤ 1 − (1 − b2)2 = 2b2 − b4 = ϕ(b) = b. (7)
A symmetric consideration applied to Player 2 shows that y2n+1 is increasing.
Let x∗ = limn→∞ x2n, and y∗ = limn→∞ y2n+1. We first contend that if x < x∗ then
limn µ2n(C1(x)) = 0. To see this note that, by definition µ2k(C1(x)) < b for some k. A
similar derivation to those applied in the proof of Theorem 1 yields that
lim
n
µ2n(C1(x)) ≤ lim
n
ϕn(µ2n(C1(x))) = 0, (8)
where the last equality follows from the fact that µ2k(Cx) < b. From this we can deduce that
limn µn(C1(x)) = 0, because for odd steps we can bound µ2n+1(C1(x)) ≤ 2µ2n(C1(x)).
Similar arguments show that for every y < y∗,
lim
n
µn(C2(y)) = 0. (9)
We next show that (x∗, y∗) lies on the Pareto efficient boundary. Equations (8) and
(9) imply that C≥≥(x, y) is nonempty for every x < x∗, and y < y∗ (see Definition 2), and
therefore C≥≥(x∗, y∗) is nonempty.
Assume by way of contradiction that (x∗, y∗) is Pareto dominated. Let (x′, y′) be any
point such that x′ > x∗, y′ > y∗, and C≥≥(x′, y′) has a nonempty interior. In particular
µ0(C≥≥(x′, y′)) > 0. We claim first that for every n,
µ2n+1(C≥≥(x′, y′)) ≥ 2bµ2n(C≥≥(x′, y′)). (10)
Because with probability at least bµ2n(C≥≥(x′, y′)) the value of the left subtree is in C1(x∗)
and the value of the right subtree is in C≥≥(x′, y′); in such a case Player 1 will choose
the outcome from C≥≥(x′, y′). However, we also have the disjoint event where the left and
right realizations are flipped (this event is disjoint because C1(x∗) ∩ C≥≥(x′, y′) = ∅) where
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again the chosen outcome is in C≥≥(x′, y′). Therefore 2bµ2n(C≥≥(x′, y′)) is a lower bound on
µ2n+1(C≥≥(x′, y′)).
A similar consideration applied to Player 2 shows that for every n,
µ2n+2(C≥≥(x′, y′)) ≥ 2bµ2n+1(C≥≥(x′, y′)). (11)
Together Equations (10) and (11) imply that for every n,
µn(C≥≥(x′, y′)) ≥ (2b)nµ(C≥≥(x′, y′)).
Since µ0(C≥≥(x′, y′)) > 0 this stands in contradiction to the fact that µn(C≥≥(x′, y′)) ≤ 1 for
every n. We must therefore have that (x∗, y∗) lies in the Pareto efficient boundary.
By Equations (8) and (9) for every x′ < x∗, and y′ < y∗ we have that, limn µn(C≥≥(x′, y′)) =
1. Since every open set U in C that contains (x∗, y∗) must also contain C(x′,y′) for some
x′ < x∗ and y′ < y∗, we must have that limn µn(U) = 1. This shows that µn weakly converges
to the Dirac measure δ(x∗,y∗), and establishes the proof of the theorem.
3.2 Random controlling player game
We denote by Pε(C) the set of points within a distance at most ε from the Pareto efficient
boundary. We say that a sequence of measures νn concentrates on the Pareto efficient
boundary if limn νn(Pε(C)) = 1 for every ε > 0.
The following proposition shows that although Val(Rn) does not concentrate around a
point, the value is (approximately) Pareto efficient with probability close to 1.
Proposition 2. The value of the random controlling player game concentrates on the Pareto
efficient boundary.
Proof. Similar to the zero-sum case (equation 5), we can deduce the following recursive
formula on (νn)n.
νn+1 = 1
2
max
1
(νn, νn) + 1
2
max
2
(νn, νn) (12)
where maxi(νn, νn) denotes the maximum over the ith coordinate of two independent real-
izations of νn.
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We let O ε
2
(C) be the set of points with a distance of precisely ε2 from the efficient
boundary. We will show first that for every (x, y) ∈ O ε
2
(C) it holds that limn νn(C≤≤(x, y)) = 0
(see Definition 2).
If not, there exists some (x′, y′) ∈ O ε
2
(C) and δ > 0 for which νn(C≤≤(x′, y′)) ≥ δ for
infinitely many n’s. As before F 1n(x) represents the probability under νn that the realised
outcome for Player 1 would be less than x and similarly F 2n(y) for Player 2.
We bound from below the probability νn+1(C>>(x′, y′)) using the recursive formula (12).
There are three events under which the realization of νn+1 lies in C>>(x′, y′).
1. Both realizations of νn lie in C>>(x′, y′). The probability of this event is (νn(C>>(x′, y′)))2.
2. Player 1 controls the root—one realization of νn is in C>>(x′, y′), and the other realiza-
tion is in F 1n(x′). The probability of the first of the two is clearly 12 . The probability
of the second is 2νn(C>>(x′, y′))F 1n(x′) since the realizations can be flipped (each can
appear in the left subgame or the right subgame). Overall this event holds with prob-
ability νn(C>>(x′, y′))F 1n(x′).
3. Player 2 controls the root—one realization of νn lies in C>>(x′, y′), and the other
realization lies in F 2n(x′). The probability of this event is νn(C>>(x′, y′))F 2n(x′).
These three events are disjoint (note that (2) and (3) are disjoint because the controlling
player defers). Therefore, we deduce that for every n
νn+1(C>>(x′, y′)) ≥ (13)
νn(C>>(x′, y′))(νn(C>>(x′, y′)) + F 1n(x′) + F 2n(y′)).
We can rewrite Equation (13) as follows
νn+1(C>>(x′, y′)) ≥ (14)
νn(C>>(x′, y′))(νn(C>>(x′, y′)) + νn(C≤>(x′, y′)) + νn(C>≤(x′, y′)) + 2νn(C≤≤(x′, y′))).
Since νn(C>>(x′, y′))+ νn(C<>(x′, y′))+ νn(C><(x′, y′))+ νn(C≤≤(x′, y′)) = 1 we conclude that
νn(C>>(x′, y′)) increases with n. Also if νn(C≤≤(x′, y′)) ≥ δ then
νn+1(C>>(x′, y′)) ≥ (1 + δ)νn(C>>(x′, y′)).
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Hence since νn(C≤≤(x′, y′)) ≥ δ for infinitely many n we have that for every k there exists n0
such that for every n > n0,
νn(C>>(x′, y′)) ≥ (1 + δ)kν0(C>>(x′, y′)).
This stands in contradiction to the fact that ν0((C>>(x′, y′))) > 0.
Fix η > 0. We show that there exists n0 such that for every n > n0,
νn(Pε(C)) ≥ 1 − η.
Choose {(xi, yi)}mi=1 ⊂ O ε2 (C) to be a finite sequence of points, dense enough such that if(x′, y′) ∈ C satisfies (x′, y′) /∈ m⋃
i=1C≤≤(xi, yi)
then (x′, y′) ∈ Pε(C), i.e., C ∖ (⋃mi=1C≤≤(xi, yi)) ⊆ Pε(C). By the above we can find large
enough n0 such that for every n > n0, and every 1 ≤ i ≤m,
νn(C≤≤(xi, yi)) ≤ η
m
.
We therefore conclude that for every n > n0,
νn(m⋃
i=1C≤≤(xi, yi)) ≤ η.
Since C ∖ (⋃mi=1C≤≤(xi, yi)) ⊆ Pε(C) we conclude that
νn(Pε(C)) ≥ 1 − η.
This completes the proof of the proposition.
4 The Hybrid Model
As we did previously, we consider as a warm-up the zero-sum case where C = [0,1]. We
establish a generalization of Theorem 1 which states that the value of the random hybrid
game Hεn converges to b
ε = √1+ε2−1+ε2ε . This is indeed a generalization of Theorem 1 because
if we set ε = 12 then the random game H1/2n = An and bε = b = √5−12 .
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Proposition 3. Val(Hεn) concentrates around the point bε = √1+ε2−1+ε2ε .
The proof uses similar ideas to the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof. For every n, let Fn(x) be the CDF of Val(Hεn). For every n we have,
F2n+1(x) = (1
2
+ ε)(F2n(x))2 + (1
2
− ε)[1 − (1 − F2n(x))2], (15)
and
F2n(x) = (1
2
− ε)(F2n(x))2 + (1
2
+ ε)[1 − (1 − F2n(x))2]. (16)
Using equations (15) and (16) we get,
F2n+2(x) = (17)
F2n(x) + (2ε)2[−2(F2n(x))3 + 3(F2n(x))2 − F2n(x)] + (2ε)3[−(F2n(x) − (F2n(x))2)2].
Let
ϕε(x) = x + (2ε)2[−2x3 + 3x2 − x] + (2ε)3[−(x − x2)2].
Simple algebraic computations show that the function ϕε has four fixed points
x1 = 0, x2 = 1, x3 = √1 + ε2 − 1 + ε
2ε
= 1√
1 + ε2 + 1 − ε, x4 = −
√
1 + ε2 + 1 − ε
2ε
.
Among these fixed points only x1, x2 and x3 are in the segment [0,1]. We denote bε = x3(ε),
and we note that bε > 12 and limε→0 bε = 12 . Note also that ϕε(x) < x for 0 < x < bε (for
instance because dϕ
ε
dx (0) = 1 − 4ε2 < 1) and ϕε(x) > x for bε < x < 1 (for instance because
dϕε
dx (1) = 1 − 4ε2 < 1). Figure 3 illustrates the function ϕε for ε = 14 .
One can see by equation (17) that
F2n+2(x) = ϕε(F2n(x)).
Similar arguments to those applied in Theorem 1 imply that Valn(Hεn) weakly converges to
bε as n grows.
The following theorem studies the asymptotic properties of Valn(Hεn) for the general
convex domain C.
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Figure 3: The function ϕε(x) for ε = 14 .
x
ϕ
1bε
1
Theorem 3. For every ε the value of the hybrid game concentrates around a Pareto efficient
point (xε, yε). Moreover, if the domain C is symmetric then limε→0 xε − yε = 0; namely, the
concentration point approaches the diagonal when ε goes to 0.
Before establishing the proof of the Theorem (Section 4.2) we present more formally the
applications of this result to bargaining and implementation.
4.1 Application to Bargaining
Given a bargaining set4 we define the random-extensive-form (REF) solution to be
lim
ε→0 limn→∞Val(Hεn).
Note that the REF solution can also be derived from a more natural version of a random
extinctive form game Rn, where the REF solution is the limit point of the medians of the
marginal distributions (see Proposition 6).
We recall that a solution is called standard if it satisfies Pareto efficiency, Symmetry, and
Invariance with respect to positive affine transformations.
Corollary 1. The REF solution is a standard solution.
4Unlike standard bargaining models, in our case a bargaining problem contains a bargaining set only,
without a disagreement point.
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Proof. Pareto efficiency and symmetry follow immediately from Theorem 3. For invariance
with respect to positive affine transformations we note that the uniform distribution remains
uniform after operating such a transformation. In addition, the subgame perfect equilibria
outcomes are invariant to such transformations.
Beyond the fact that the REF solution satisfies several desirable axioms, the main ad-
vantage of the REF solution is the fact that this solution has a very clean probabilistic
(approximate) implementation. We set small ε and large n. Now we simply randomize the
decision makers and the outcomes in the game as it is done in the hybrid game Hεn. With
high probability the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game is close to the REF
solution.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 3
We start with a proof of the first part of Theorem 3 (regarding the concentration around a
Pareto efficient point). In fact, we derive a stronger statement which provides also a type of
characterization for the concentration point.
We denote by χεn the probability distribution of Val(Hnε ) and for i = 1,2 we let F i,εn be the
CDF of the marginal distribution of νεn over the payoffs to Player i. We define x
ε
n to be the
unique number x such that F 1,εn (x) = bε. Similarly, yεn is the number y such that F 2,ε(y) = bε.
Proposition 4. The sequences xεn and y
ε
n have the following properties.
(A1) {xε2n}n and {yε2n+1}n are monotonically increasing in n.
(A2) {(xεn, yεn)}n is a converging sequence.
(A3) (xεn, yεn) →nÐ→∞ (xε, yε), namely, the limit of the sequence is the concentration point of
Val(Hnε ).
(A4) (xε, yε) lies on the Pareto efficient boundary of C.
Proof. By applying identical considerations to those in the proof of Theorem 2, and replacing
b by bε we get exactly all these properties.
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Now we get to the proof of the second statement in Theorem 3. The proof is based on
a connection between the sequences of measures Val(Rn) and Val(Hεn) (see Proposition 6).
In order to state this connection we need an additional convergence statement about the
random structure games Val(Rn).
We denote by F 1n , F
2
n the CDFs of the marginal distribution of νn = Val(Rn) over the
payoffs to Player 1,2. We denote by xn and yn the medians of F 1n and F
2
n (respectively).
Proposition 5. The sequences xn and yn are monotonically increasing. Moreover the limit
point (x, y) = limn→∞(xn, yn) lies on the Pareto efficient boundary of5 C.
Proof. For a ∈ R we denote C1(a) = {c ∈ c ∶ c1 < a}. In order to prove that {xn}n is
monotonically increasing it is sufficient to show that νn+1(C1(xn)) ≤ 12 .
With probability 12 Player 1 controls the node, and in such a case, the result (at the(n + 1)th iteration) is in C1(xn) iff both i.i.d. realizations (according to νn) are in C1(xn).
The probability of such an event is (νn(C1(xn)))2 = 14 .
With probability 12 Player 2 controls the node, and in such a case, a necessary condition
for the result (at the (n+ 1)th iteration) to be in C1(xn) is that at least one realization is in
C1(xn). The probability of such an event is 1 − (νn(C1(xn)))2 = 34 .
Summarizing, over the two cases we get νn+1(C1(xn)) ≤ 12 ⋅ 14 + 12 ⋅ 34 = 12 .
Similar arguments show that the sequence {yn}n is monotonically increasing.
Now we turn to the proof of statement (2).
Assume by way of contradiction that (x, y) lies in the interior of C, and then ν0(C>>(x, y)) >
0 (see Definition 2). By equation (13) (which holds for the random controlling player case)
we have that for every n,
νn+1(C>>(x, y)) ≥ νn(C>>(x, y))(νn(C>>(x, y)) + F 1n(x) + F 2n(y)).
Since xn ≤ x (and yn ≤ y) we have F 1n(x) + F 2n(y) ≥ 1. Hence,
νn+1(C>>(x, y)) ≥ νn(C>>(x, y))(νn(C>>(x, y)) + 1),
5Unlike other structures of random games discussed in this paper, in the (symmetric) random structure
we do not have a concentration of the limit measure around the point (x, y). Nevertheless, the proposition
states that the limit point (x, y) is well defined, and is Pareto efficient.
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which contradicts the fact that νn(C>>(x, y)) ≤ 1 for every n.
Assume by way of contradiction that (x, y) lies out of the C. Then for some finite n′(xn′ , yn′) is out of the set C. We denote A1 = {c ∈ C ∶ c1 ≥ xn′} and A2 = {c ∈ C ∶ c2 ≥ yn′}.
Note that A1 ∩A2 = ∅, and νn′(A1) = νn′(A2) = 12 , which implies that νn′(C<<(xn′ , yn′)) = 0.
This contradicts the fact that the density of νn remains strictly positive everywhere in C for
every finite n.
Therefore (x, y) must lie on the Pareto efficient boundary.
The connection between the sequences of measures Val(Rn) and Val(Hεn) is given by
following proposition, which states that the concentration point of Val(Hεn) is close to the
limit of medians of Val(Rn) from Proposition 5.
Proposition 6. limε→0(xε, yε) = (x, y).
We emphasize that Val(Hεn) and Val(Rn) behave very differently for large n (the first
one concentrates around a point, whereas the latter does not). Therefore it is somewhat
surprising that we succeeded to connect the concentration point of Val(Hεn) with some object
that is derived from the sequence {Val(Rn)}.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let λ = λ(C) be a global Lipschitz constant such that for every two
points (a1, a2) and (b1, b2) on the Pareto efficient boundary of C holds6
1
λ
∣a1 − b1∣ ≤ ∣a2 − b2∣ ≤ λ∣a1 − b1∣. (18)
We set δ > 0, and we shall prove that there exists ε(δ) > 0 such that for every ε < ε(δ)
holds ∣∣(xε, yε) − (x, y)∣∣∞ ≤ δ. The way we do it is by considering the sequences {(xn, yn)}n
and {(xεn, yεn)}n.
By Proposition 5 limn(xn, yn) = (x, y), so there exists n0 such that
∣x2n0 − x∣ ≤ δ3λ and ∣y2n0+1 − y∣ ≤ δ3λ. (19)
6Actually we do not have to assume existence of a global Lipschitz constant for the Pareto efficient
boundary. Existence of a local Lipschitz constant around the point (x, y) will suffice for the arguments that
we present here in the proof.
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We emphasize that n0 does not depend on ε (because n0 depends only on a symmetric
random structure where ε is not involved).
We denote by xmed,εn and y
med,ε
n the medians of F
1,ε
n and F
2,ε
n . By Lemma 2 the measures
χε2n0 and χ
ε
2n0+1 are strongly continuous with respect to ε. In particular, it follows that the
medians of χε converge to the medians of ν. Namely, limε→0 xmed,ε2n0 = x2n0 and limε→0 ymed,ε2n0+1 =
y2n0+1. Therefore, there exists ε′ such that for every ε < ε′ holds
∣xmed,ε2n0 − x2n0 ∣ ≤ δ3λ and ∣ymed,ε2n0+1 − y2n0+1∣ ≤ δ3λ. (20)
Note that F 1,ε2n0(x) and F 2,ε2n0+1(y) are continuous with respect to x and y (respectively).
Note also that limε→0 bε = 12 . Therefore by the definition of xεn and yεn there exists ε′′ such
that for every ε < ε′′ holds
∣xε2n0 − xmed,ε2n0 ∣ ≤ δ3λ and ∣yε2n0+1 − ymed,ε2n0+1∣ ≤ δ3λ. (21)
If we set ε(δ) = min(ε′, ε′′) then inequalities (19), (20), and (21) guarantee that
∣∣(x2n0 , y2n0+1) − (x, y)∣∣∞ ≤ δλ.
By properties (1) and (3) in Proposition 4 (at the beginning of the proof) we know that(xε, yε) Pareto dominates the point (x2n0 , y2n0+1). In addition, by Proposition 5 we know
that (x, y) is Pareto efficient. By the definition of λ together with the above three properties
we get that ∣∣(xε, yε) − (x, y)∣∣∞ ≤ δ.
Lemma 2. For every constant n0 the measure χ(ε) = Val(Hεn0) is strongly continuous (in
the total variation distance) with respect to ε around ε = 0.
Proof. The random variable Val(Hεn0) can be obtained by the following procedure.
1. We randomize 2n0 i.i.d. random outcomes according to ν = µ0.
2. For each node v we choose Player i = 1,2 to control node v with probability 12 .
3. For each node v we draw a Bernoulli random variable ev = 0,1 with Pr(ev = 1) = 2ε.
4. For each odd-depth node v, if ev = 1 we set Player 1 to control the node (irrespective
of who was chosen to control it at step (2)).
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5. For each even-depth node v, if ev = 1 we set Player 2 to control the node (irrespective
of who was chosen to control it at step (2)).
6. We apply backward induction on the resulted game.
Note that Pr[ev = 0 for all v] = (1 − 2ε)2n0−1. In such a case (of ev = 0 for all v) we have
exactly the random variable Val(Rn0). Therefore the total variation distance is bounded by
dTV (Val(Rn0),Val(Hεn0)) ≤ 1 − (1 − 2ε)2n0−1, i.e., limε→0 dTV (Val(Rn0),Val(Rεn0)) = 0.
Now Theorem 3 follows immediately from Propositions 4 and 6.
Proof of Theorem 3. The first part of the Theorem is proved in Proposition 4 items (3) and
(4). Regarding the second part, if C is symmetric then xn = yn for every n, and therefore
obviously x = y. So Proposition 6 completes the proof.
5 Discussion
1. General settings for which all the results hold. By looking on the proofs of the
results one can observe that the properties of the domain C which were used in the proofs
are as follows:
1. C is a compact set with a non-empty interior.
2. For every not Pareto efficient point (x, y) ∈ C the set C≥≥(x, y) has a non-empty interior.
3. The Pareto efficient boundary forms a connected path which has the Lipschitz property.
This requirement is needed only for the analysis of the hybrid game.
These are very minimalistic requirements which include in particular the cases where C is a
simply connected set with a concave Pareto efficient boundary (rather than convex).
Again by looking at the proofs of the results one can observe that the only property on
the initial distribution µ0 that was used is the fact that µ0 is a non-atomic measure with
strictly positive density over all C. The only change in the results (but not in the proofs)
that is caused by changing the uniform distribution by a general distribution µ0 is Theorem
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1: The concentration point is obviously not the point b ≈ 0.62 but the point c for which
µ0([0, c]) = b.
2. Games over ternary trees. The paper focuses on the case where the game tree is
a complete binary tree. The techniques derived in the paper can be applied also for the case
where the game tree is ternary. We overview here the results for this case (without proofs).
As we can see part of the results are similar but part are not:
• The value of the alternating game concentrates around a Pareto efficient point. In the
case of a zero-sum game the concentration is around b = 0.68, where b is the unique
solution of 1 − (1 − x3)3 = x in the segment (0,1). These results are similar to the case
of binary trees.
• The value of the random controlling player game converges to the distribution τ which
assigns a probability of 12 to both points m1,m2 ∈ C, where mi is the best point in
C for Player i. This statement holds for both, the zero sum case and the case of a
general two-dimensional set C. These results defer from the binary case where the
limit measure has positive density over the entire Pareto efficient boundary.
• For small enough values of ε, the value of the hybrid game converges to τ ε, where τ ε
assigns a probability ε close to 12 to m1 (from the previous bullet) and the remaining
probability to m2. In particular, the hybrid game fails to have the desirable property
of concentration around a point. Namely, a different random structure than the hybrid
game is required in order to implement a standard solution in ternary games.
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